Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States. by Esser, Frank
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2008
Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in
France, Germany, Great Britain and the United States.
Esser, Frank
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208323691
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-8065
Originally published at:
Esser, Frank (2008). Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in France,
Germany, Great Britain and the United States. International Journal of Press/Politics, 13(4):401-428.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161208323691
http://hij.sagepub.com
Press/Politics 
The International Journal of
DOI: 10.1177/1940161208323691 
 2008; 13; 401 The International Journal of Press/Politics
Frank Esser 
 France, Germany, Great Britain, and the United States
Dimensions of Political News Cultures: Sound Bite and Image Bite News in
http://hij.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/13/4/401
 The online version of this article can be found at:
 Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
 can be found at:The International Journal of Press/Politics Additional services and information for 
 http://hij.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Email Alerts:
 http://hij.sagepub.com/subscriptions Subscriptions:
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints: 
 http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions: 
 http://hij.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/13/4/401
SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
 (this article cites 21 articles hosted on the Citations
 at Zentralbibliothek Zuerich on September 23, 2008 http://hij.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
401
Press/Politics 13(4):401-428
DOI: 10.1177/1940161208323691
© 2008 Sage Publications
Dimensions of Political News Cultures:
Sound Bite and Image Bite News
in France, Germany, Great Britain,
and the United States
Frank Esser
This study offers the first systematic analysis of sound bites and image bites across
countries and across time. It goes beyond traditional sound bite research by extending
the scope of analysis also to visuals and by analyzing both sound and image bites not
only with regard to their length but also with regard to their content and editorial
packaging. Based on these findings, contours of three different political news
cultures emerge: a strongly interventionist U.S. American approach, a moderately
interventionist Anglo-German approach, and a noninterventionist French approach.
Adopting an explicitly cross-national comparative perspective, the study introduces a
theoretical model that explains sound bite news in divergent media systems and links
it to the concept of media culture. It derives seven hypotheses from the model and
tests them on three levels of analysis—organizational, national, and transnational.
Despite a growing transnational convergence, multivariate data analysis shows
evidence of the enduring importance that national parameters continue to exert.
Conclusions for comparative political communication research are drawn.
Keywords: comparative research; election campaign; journalism; news reporting; press
systems; television news
News culture is an important concept for comparative communication
research. It differs from research into media systems or journalistic cultures in
that it does not focus the attention on institutional arrangements or attitudinal
profiles but on content features.This study aims to demonstrate how a cross-
national analysis of sound and image bites can serve as a meaningful example
for characterizing different political news cultures. The starting point is the
United States, where the average sound bite—meaning a block of uninter-
rupted speech by a candidate on television news—shrunk from forty-two sec-
onds in 1968 to about eight seconds in 2004 (Farnsworth and Lichter 2007).
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Patterson concluded that the United States has reached the point of “voiceless
candidates” because they have been given fewer and fewer chances to speak for
themselves; in fact, candidates are said to have been “squeezed out” of election
coverage (Patterson 1993: 74–75).
This study argues that this development, although significant, may not be
the whole story. First, it seems useful to broaden the distinctly American per-
spective in this line of research and inquire to what extent sound bite news
is an element of western news culture in general. Second, it appears useful
to re-evaluate the role of pure “voiceless” image bites and to analyze them as separate
entities.Third, it seems necessary to clearly identify the theoretical concepts
and explanatory factors behind sound bite news that are at play in different
media systems. The fourth innovation of this study is a comprehensive
correspondence analysis that—on the basis of all relevant variables—
discerns three distinct political news cultures: a strongly interventionist (U.S.
American), a moderately interventionist (Anglo-German), and a noninterventionist
(French) one.
Sound Bites and Image Bites
This study follows Hallin’s (1992) definition of sound bites as film segments
within a news story that show someone speak without interruption. In the liter-
ature, shrinking candidate sound bites are usually seen as an indicator of an
increasingly media-centered reporting style in which the initiator of election nar-
ratives is the journalist, not the candidate. From this perspective, shrinking can-
didate sound bites refer to a reporting style that emphasizes the role of the
journalist who summarizes, contextualizes, and evaluates politicians’messages—
and who basically does the speaking for the candidates (Farnsworth and Lichter
2007).As a result, much of what voters hear about the candidates is rarely from
the candidates themselves. This, it is assumed, undermines the authenticity of
electoral coverage (Patterson 1993) and makes it more difficult for viewers to
fully make sense of a candidate’s policies (Donsbach and Jandura 2003).
But audio is not the only information channel on television.Although many
sound bite researchers have called for a greater analysis of visuals, hitherto, not
many scholars have taken up this call. Bucy and Grabe (2007) are an important
exception in this respect, and their work inspired us to study image bites more
systematically across different political and journalistic cultures. Our defini-
tion of image bites as film segments within a news story in which someone is
shown but not heard follows the early conceptualization of Steele and
Barnhurst (1996; Barnhurst and Steele 1997). Research on information pro-
cessing theory has shown that the human brain prefers processing visual over
verbal information. As Bucy and Grabe (2007) rightfully pointed out, visual
experience is the dominant mode of learning.TV viewers recall visuals better
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than verbal information, andTV viewers base their evaluations of people more
readily on what they see rather than on what they hear. Against this back-
ground, it is surprising that image bites have not been examined more exten-
sively in the past.
Explaining Sound Bites and Image Bites
from a Comparative Perspective
From a comparative perspective, how can the use of sound bites and image
bites be explained theoretically? Scholars such as Hallin (1992), Patterson
(1993), Steele and Barnhurst (1996),Donsbach and Jandura (2003), Farnsworth
and Lichter (2007), and Vos (2008) argue that the more journalist-centered,
faster paced, and enhanced visual style of news has more than just aesthetic
implications.They interpret it as a professionally motivated behavior by journal-
ists to increase their influence, authority, and prestige—and ultimately, their
control over the news. In theoretical terms, this refers to the “media’s discre-
tionary power” or “journalistic intervention” (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995,
2001; Semetko et al. 1991). The journalistic attitude toward intervention in
election campaigns is high when journalists report the campaign in their own
words, scenarios, assessments—and when they grant politicians only limited
opportunities to present themselves with sound bites and image bites in the
news. High interventionism is found in a journalistic culture that Semetko et al.
(1991; see also Blumler and Gurevitch 1995) labeled “pragmatic” as opposed to
“sacerdotal.”Whereas a sacerdotal approach considers political statements and
activities as intrinsically important and as something that deserves to be reported
authentically and extensively, a pragmatic approach insists that political material
should fight its way into news programs on its news value only and in consider-
ation of the newsworthiness of competing stories. In a pragmatic news culture,
candidates’ statements are likely to be used to a lesser extent and more often as
raw material in the construction of the reporter’s own story.
Research into news cultures has made headway in recent years.Two other
journalistic orientations have been found to be closely related to intervention-
ist attitudes: the first is proximity versus distance to power holders, and the
second is market logic versus public service logic (see Pfetsch 2004; Hanitzsch
2007). Journalists with great distance to power holders tend to be very skep-
tical of assertions made by politicians, whereas journalists with close proxim-
ity to authorities tend to be more defensive of them, more loyal to their
interests, and more receptive to their statements (and thus, less intervention-
ist). Journalists in a market-oriented culture produce news primarily to
achieve commercial goals, whereas journalists in a public interest–oriented
culture tend to regard their audience as citizens rather than consumers and
produce news more with respect to the democratic needs of society (and thus,
Esser/ Dimensions of Political News Cultures 403
 at Zentralbibliothek Zuerich on September 23, 2008 http://hij.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
less interventionist). These insights from Pfetsch’s (2004) and Hanitzsch’s
(2007) works on culture enrich our understanding of the role and relation of
interventionism and allow us to develop more complex hypotheses and more
context-sensitive explanations when looking at different countries.
From a comparative perspective,we expect substantial cross-national variation
in journalistic attitudes with regard to the notion that the media may play an
active and independent role in shaping the coverage of election campaigns.
According to Blumler and Gurevitch (2001), the degree of media intervention is
affected by the political setting and the media setting of the respective country.
Figure 1 offers a graphic illustration of the relevant factors (drawn from
Blumler and Gurevitch 2001 and Semetko et al. 1991) that vary across national
political communication systems and help predict the extent of the news
media’s discretionary power in using sound bites and image bites.With regard
to independent variables, the model expects journalistic attitudes that favor
more frequent interventions in campaign news to flourish in a
political culture in which public opinion is more cynical and distrustful of political
institutions because it creates a climate in which adversarial journalism seems
socially acceptable;
media culture that is leaning toward a more pragmatic approach (guided by strict
news values and a general skepticism toward statements made by those in
power) than to a sacerdotal approach (regarding the reportage of political news
and positions as an inherently important service to democracy that must be
provided as of right);
highly professionalized journalistic community that has achieved a status of independence
from outside interference (especially from political control), the development
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Figure 1
Factors Influencing Journalistic Intervention in Different National Contexts
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of autonomous and distinctively journalistic criteria that guide the production
of news, and the evolution of proactive, party-distant role perceptions such as
interpreter, critic, watchdog, or entertainer;
highly professionalized election campaign characterized by a strong focus on news
management, message control, and restricted media access;
political structure with weak party organizations, weak party loyalties in the elec-
torate, and weak influence of party ideologies on social life; or
media structure that is subject to only very light state regulation and in which broad-
casters are less guided by public service obligations but more by commercial
considerations, profit orientations, and competitive market pressures.
With regard to dependent variables, the model expects that a high level of
journalistic intervention will lead to
shorter candidate sound bites but longer journalist sound bites,
candidate sound bites with less policy content but attack-related and campaign
buzz–related content,
image bites that portray candidates in a less authoritative light and show journal-
ists in more potent light, and
a smaller amount of election news coverage in general.
By contrast, in settings with low levels of journalistic intervention, we
expect to observe the opposite tendencies. An important new twist to this
study is that it analyzes both sound and image bites also for their content and
editorial packaging.To measure the subject matter of sound bites, we adapted
the “content” category from Bucy and Grabe (2007), and to measure the con-
tent of image bites, we drew on “facial display” categories from Bucy and
Bradley (2004) and Kepplinger (1987, 1999).The packaging of image bites was
analyzed by adapting Kepplinger’s (1987) “selection bias” category, Grabe’s
(2007) “lip flap” category, and Hallin’s (1992) “wrap up” category.The special
emphasis on visuals marks a renunciation of the traditional view that the length
of bites in which politicians are seen speaking captures their entire meaningful
presence in a news story. Bucy and Grabe (2007) disagree and argue that even
a merely visual appearance can also convey meaningful information (about
aspects that remain unspoken but may be of value to voters in assessing a can-
didate) and should not be disregarded by political communication researchers.
We expect the use of candidates’ image bites in news programs to be extensive,
and increasing, because visuals allow for more personalized, captivating, and
entertaining reports (Bucy and Grabe 2007; Steele and Barnhurst 1996).The
use of powerful images also allows journalists to impose a specific tone in their
reports: Discrediting pictures may reflect a skeptical attack-dog attitude toward
politicians, whereas flattering pictures may reflect a more sacerdotal lapdog or
guard-dog attitude (Donohue,Tichenor, and Olien 1995).
Esser/ Dimensions of Political News Cultures 405
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Organizational Culture, National Culture,
orTransnational News Culture?
Hanitzsch (2007) sees interventionism, power distance, and market orien-
tation as forming a common attitudinal dimension of journalism culture. He
conceptualized culture as a shared occupational ideology that expresses itself
in three ways: ideas (journalistic attitudes, worldviews, and role perceptions),
practices (reporting methods and routines of news production), and artifacts
(media products, news stories).Whereas research into “journalistic culture” is
usually survey-based and focuses on ideas and their relevance for practices,
research into “news culture” is content-based and concentrates on the manifes-
tations of these ideas and practices in artifacts.We consider sound and image
bites as prototypical features of television news cultures and aim to identify the
systematic patterns that guide their use and can be seen as symbolic expres-
sions of the underlying journalistic culture.1
To explain news content from a comparative perspective, three levels of
analysis must be examined: national, organizational, and transnational (Reese
2001; see also Figure 1). On the national level, the media system typology of
Hallin and Mancini (2004) leads us to classify the United States as a national
news culture whose contextual setting favors the largest degree of journalistic
intervention (for an elaborate argument, see Blumler and Gurevitch 2001;
Semetko et al. 1991; Strömbäck and Dimitrova 2006).At the other extreme of
the spectrum is France, a prototype of the polarized pluralist model of
media–politics relations, where we expect the least inclination to journalistic
intervention (for an instructive comparison of the media systems of the United
States, France, Germany, and Britain, see Hallin and Mancini 2004). France’s
long history of government-controlled broadcasting hindered the development
of a strong and independent journalistic culture, and up to this day, “breeds con-
nivance between journalists and politicians” (Chalaby 2005: 287). Despite a
recent decline in journalistic deference, “the mass of French journalists remain
significantly less adversarial and less autonomous in their relationship with elite
politicians than their Anglo-American counterparts” (Kuhn 2005a: 319). In
both the 2002 and 2007 elections, the French media tended to follow the cam-
paign themes set by the leading candidates rather than set the agenda themselves
(Kuhn 2005b, 2007). Germany and Great Britain take middle positions.Their
broadcast systems are both typical of the democratic-corporatist model of
media–politics relations.2 Germany and Great Britain are characterized by
stronger party organizations and party-centered political negotiation processes
than the United States, which leads us to assume a smaller power distance (and
more consensual symbiosis) between the news media and politicians (Pfetsch
2004; Esser and D’Angelo 2006).Yet, journalistic attitudes toward intervention
are expected to be more pronounced than in France because of less government
406 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
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interference in broadcasting and stronger professional autonomy of the journal-
istic community (Hallin and Mancini 2004). In sum, this “nations matter” argu-
ment lets us expect considerable differences between national news cultures
with regard to journalistic intervention.Methodologically, it requires a country
sample that reflects the divergent broadcast systems.
Yet, there can be considerable variation within news cultures. Therefore,
our second level of analysis looks at the different organizational cultures in
public and commercial broadcasting newsrooms (Harrison 2000; Holtz-Bacha
and Norris 2001; Kueng-Shankleman 2000). Public service television, of
which the BBC is the oldest and most influential role model, is the birthplace
of a sacerdotal news culture and committed to principles of plurality, impar-
tiality, program quality, social responsibility, and in-depth reporting. Recent
competition from commercial competitors has doubtlessly led some European
public broadcasters to dilute their commitment to an informed citizenry
somewhat in favor of a more audience-oriented, depoliticized reporting style.
On the other hand, some European commercial channels picked up patterns
from public service channels to meet traditionally rooted audience expecta-
tions. In general, however, commercial channels can be expected to follow a
distinctly different, more ratings- and profit-oriented approach, which favors
a more dramatic, attention-grabbing reporting style that requires less effort
and investment on the part of the producers as well as the recipients. In this
news-you-can-use environment, extensive political debate is often considered
a turnoff. In sum, this “organizations matter” argument expects, especially
within the European countries, substantial differences between newsroom cul-
tures of commercial and public broadcasters. Methodologically, it requires a
sample that contains both types of broadcasters.
Our third level of analysis refers to transnational influences and expects a
growing convergence of westernTV cultures over time.Western countries and
their broadcast systems are increasingly affected by similar technological inno-
vations, secularization processes, commercial pressures, and increasing com-
petition for people’s attention (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 251–73). In
addition, the growing diffusion of common practices in journalism training
may also have contributed to the consolidation of news standards in Britain,
France, Germany, and the United States. Other factors, such as growing inter-
action of western journalists through covering the same events and using the
same agencies and media outlets (WTN, CNN, HeraldTribune, FinancialTimes),
may also have supported a transnational convergence of journalistic tech-
niques, practices, and values over the years (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Reese
2001; Swanson 2004). In sum, this “diffusion matters” argument expects west-
ern broadcasters to form an increasingly narrow and homogeneous cluster.
Methodologically, it focuses the attention to western cases and a longitudinal
design.
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Hypotheses
Based on the assumptions that could be derived from our model and our
three levels of analysis, we formulated seven hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1:The total amount ofTV election news coverage is lowest on the com-
mercial channels in the United States and highest on the public service channels
in Europe.
Hypothesis 2a:The average length of candidate sound bites is shorter in the United
States than in the European countries (because of a more cynical political cul-
ture, a more skeptical media culture, a more commercial media structure, and
a less party-dominated political structure).
Hypothesis 2b:Within Europe, candidate sound bites on public service channels are
longer than on the commercial channels (because of public interest require-
ments to serve the needs of the political system by providing information-rich
and balanced candidate information).
Hypothesis 3a: The cumulative speaking time of journalists outweighs cumulative
speaking time of candidates to a greater extent in the United States than in the
European countries (because of a more pragmatic national news culture that is
guided by strict news values and a general skepticism toward statements made
by those in power).
Hypothesis 3b: In Europe, cumulative speaking time of journalists outweighs that of
candidates to a greater extent on profit-oriented commercial channels (because
market-driven journalism tends to be “news lite” or even “antipolitics”).
Hypothesis 4: Content of candidate sound bites is oriented more toward issue sub-
stance on European news, especially on public service channels, than on U.S.
news. In the more commercial and adversarial U.S. culture, content of candi-
date sound bites is expected to be characterized more by attack rhetoric and
campaign rhetoric.
Hypothesis 5:The average length of candidate sound bites is shorter in election cam-
paigns that are tightly scripted and carefully staged (indicating a correlation
between high levels of news management and high levels of journalistic resis-
tance and intervention).
Hypothesis 6a: The candidates’ pure image bites account for a substantial part of
election stories, at least equaling the duration of candidate sound bites per story
(because they answer a transnational need to deliver more attention-grabbing
reports).
Hypothesis 6b: It is further stipulated that the use of image bites has grown in west-
ern nations over time and is favored more on commercial than public service
channels.
Hypothesis 7: Image bites are selected, edited, and packaged in ways that are more
disadvantageous to candidates in the United States (because of a more cynical
political culture, a more skeptical media culture, a more commercial media
structure, and a less party-dominated political structure) than in Europe.
408 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
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Method
To test the seven hypotheses, we conducted a content analysis of all election-
related stories in the last four weeks before polling day on the flagship evening
news bulletins of U.S.–American, British, German, and French TV channels
over two periods of time: the first period stretching from 2000 to 2002, the
second from 2004 to 2007. In the United States, we content-analyzed ABCWorld
News Tonight and NBC Nightly News; in Great Britain, the ten o’clock news on
BBC1 and ITV1; in Germany, ARD Tagesthemen and RTL Aktuell; and in France
(where, unfortunately, only the 2007 data were available), the eight o’clock
news onTF1 and France 2.All broadcasts follow similar formats, are anchored
by prominent journalists, and provide a net news time between thirty minutes
on the license fee–financed public service broadcasting stations of ARD, BBC1,
and F2 and twenty-two minutes on the privately owned, advertising-financed
stations of ABC, NBC, ITV1, RTL, andTF1.
First, all news shows were tape-recorded in their entirety.3 Then all those
items, however brief, that were labeled or framed as general election stories
were copied onto separate compilation tapes. In operational terms, the uni-
verse of this study consists of all stories that contained a clear verbal or visual
reference to the upcoming general election—usually, but not always, in the
form of a background logo or an anchor remark. Some of these stories did not
mention the candidates at all, and others offered lengthy sit-down interviews
with them. It is noteworthy that most American sound bite studies exclude
interview stories a priori from their samples (e.g., Hallin 1992; Farnsworth
and Lichter 2007), which leads them to report shorter sound bite lengths for
U.S. candidates than our analysis does (see findings for Hypothesis 2). Yet,
from our theoretical standpoint, it would be unfair, and in fact, a severe case
of selection bias to ban all those stories from the analysis in which journalists
try to respond to scholarly criticism by actively inviting candidates to partici-
pate in the news discourse in a more lengthy manner.
Specially trained teams of international coders were broken up into pairs of
two and then assigned to stories depending on their language skills and country
familiarity. Using Kerbel,Apee, and Ross’s (2000) coding procedure as a guide-
line, each story was thus examined by two coders simultaneously. Agreement
was required of both; discrepancies were resolved through discussion. If, despite
repeated viewing, no agreement could be reached on a specific category, that
variable was not coded. All teams were coached by the author until blind tests
showed individual intercoder agreement was above 90 percent for all relevant
categories. Most categories required only simple stop-watch measurements.
The official campaign periods in the United States, Great Britain,
Germany, and France differ substantially in length.4 The only way to construct
strictly equivalent samples for all campaigns in all countries was to analyze all
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election-related stories that aired in the last twenty workdays before polling
day.This yielded a total number of 1,308 stories on the above-mentioned sta-
tions, with an overall length of 2,716 minutes or 45.3 program hours that
were eventually coded and form the empirical basis of this study (seeTable 1).
Coding of the 2000–2002 period was already completed when we learned of
the study of Bucy and Grabe (2007), which inspired us to include several of
their categories for the second wave, 2004–2007.There remain, however, con-
ceptual differences between our studies, particularly with respect to sampling
periods, sampling structure, and operational definitions.5
Results
Hypothesis 1: News Hole Size
The first hypothesis predicted the total amount of election coverage to be
lowest in the United States. This was not confirmed, because the smallest
410 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
Table 1
Cross-national and cross-temporal content analysis of leading news programs during last four
weeks of campaigning
United Great
States Britain Germany
2000 2001 2002
ABC NBC BBC1# ITV1 ARD# RTL France 2002
Number of election stories 75 56 147 87 54 30 Not coded
Mean story length (sec) 118 138 138 114 178 107
Cumulative story length (min) 148 118 338 165 161 53
Total length of election news (min) 266 503 214
United Great
States Britain Germany France
2004 2005 2005 2007
ABC NBC BBC1# ITV1 ARD# RTL TF1 F2#
Number of election stories 120 94 141 171 59 36 103 135
Mean story length (sec) 99 126 149 122 137 103 113 113
Cumulative story length (min) 199 197 351 344 132 62 193 255
Total length of election news (min) 396 695 194 448
Note: N = 1,308 stories from ABCWorld News, NBC Nightly News, BBC News at 10, ITV News at
10:30, ARD Tagesthemen, RTL Aktuell, TF1 Journal, and F2 Journal that made clear reference to
the ongoing national campaign. Every election story that aired on these programs during the
last twenty workdays before polling day was coded.Weekend newscasts were excluded. #
indicates license fee–financed public service broadcaster.
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amount occurs on German newscasts (214 minutes in 2002 and 194 minutes
in 2005; see Table 1). This can be explained by two special characteristics of
German TV news culture: first by an “outsourcing” of election reporting to
specialized programs apart from regular news shows, and second, by a “pater-
nalistic stance” of German news editors to sort out the “truly newsworthy”
from the “same old thing.”A comparative study by Semetko (1996) found sim-
ilar features already back in the early 1990s.
In Britain, the traditionally high levels of coverage increased even further
(from 503 minutes in 2001 to 695 minutes in 2005) after criticism that broad-
casters had been trivializing politics in the past. ITV1 made a deliberate move in
2005 to expand its election coverage by conducting exceptionally lengthy inter-
views with the three main party leaders in their main news bulletins (Deacon,
Wring, and Golding 2006). For the BBC, public service is still a strong guiding
principle that pressures its commercial competitor to absorb some of these val-
ues as well.This brings us to the second part of Hypothesis 1, which predicted
more extensive coverage on public than commercial channels.This is confirmed
in all European countries (the BBC higher than ITV,ARD higher than RTL, and
F2 higher thanTF1 across both election cycles). In sum,we noticed strong influ-
ences by newsroom cultures and by national traditions.
Hypothesis 2: Sound Bite Length
The second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2a) expected the average length of can-
didate sound bites to be shorter in the United States than in the European
countries.This was clearly confirmed and speaks in favor of different national
news cultures (Table 2). Including interview stories, we recorded an average
length of candidate sound bites of 10.6 seconds in 2000 and 8.8 seconds in
2004 on U.S. network news.6 However, the data from the European countries
do show indications of a growing similarity with the United States.Other stud-
ies from Germany (Schulz and Zeh 2007) and Britain (Deacon,Wring, and
Golding 2006) have also documented a clear downward development in the
length of candidates’ on-air statements since the early 1990s. Only repeated
future replications will tell whether these findings are indeed part of a conver-
gence process toward shorter sound snippets, faster paced cuts, and tightly
packaged news stories.The notable increase in the 2005 British election may
turn out to be an exception from an otherwise dominant transnational rule.7
The second hypothesis (Hypothesis 2b) also predicted that on public service
channels, sound bites would be longer than on commercial channels.This was
confirmed for the first but not the second period under investigation. In
2001–2002, the public channels of BBC1 andARD granted significantly longer
candidate sound bites than their commercial competitors ITV1 and RTL. Four
years later, the gap between public and commercial channels had narrowed
412 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
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noticeably—and it also did so in France (see Table 2 for details). This is an
indication that newsroom cultures are slowly losing their explanatory power
with regard to accounting for the variance of sound bite news across countries.
In sum, the distinctions between national cultures and newsroom cultures,
though still present, appear to be slowly evaporating.
Hypothesis 3: DominantVoice
Because a news story can contain several candidate statements (or none), it
is not sufficient to look at individual sound bites only.To fully assess the extent
to which journalists control the airwaves at the expense of candidates, it is also
necessary to compare the cumulative speaking time of candidates to the cumu-
lative speaking time of journalists. The third hypothesis, which expected
reporters’ narration to outweigh that of candidates to a greater extent on com-
mercial channels, especially those of the United States, was disconfirmed.
Contrary to Hypothesis 3a, journalists’ verbal presence was not greatest in the
United States (where it ranged between 27.4 and 42.9 seconds across the two
election cycles) but in Britain (34.1 to 56.0 seconds) and Germany (36.6 to
71.6 seconds; seeTable 3). In fact, and contrary to Hypothesis 3b, journalists’
verbal presence was greatest on the public service channels.The reason for this
is that BBC1 and ARD offered lengthy interpretative pieces—either in the
form of analysis and examination (in the case of BBC1’s News at 10) or in the
form of editorial commentary (e.g., in the case of ARDTagesthemen).
An even better indicator of journalists’ domination than their cumulative
speaking time in seconds is their proportional speaking time as a percentage.
With remarkable consistency—but with the telling exception of France—the
time devoted to journalists’ narration in election stories averages between 30
and 40 percent in all countries across all channels and all years (see data for
“journalists seen speaking as percentage of average story length” in Table 3).
Put differently, there is an almost universal transnational rule across Britain,
Germany, and the United States that reporters’ narration outweighs that of
candidates by three to one. Journalists set the tone in the verbal stream of elec-
tion news, not the candidates. The exception is France, where journalists’
power in the delivery of political communication is less pronounced.This is in
line with our expectation and seems to indicate that election news in France is
structured less by an autonomous, interventionist media logic than it is in the
other countries we examined.
These findings qualify a prominent claim in the existing research literature
that says that “the American case is unique” with respect to forceful journalis-
tic intervention and that “in other democracies the press is the secondary voice
in election news” (Patterson 1993: 77). Not only do our results disprove this
assertion, they also indicate that a more journalist-centered narrative does not
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necessarily mean more cynicism. It can—for example, in the case of BBC1—
also mean more in-depth reports to prepare citizens for better informed
voting decisions and a more meaningful participation in the political process.
In fact, the so-called Birt revolution at the BBC called on journalists to provide
more explanation and analysis in their reports (Harrison 2000).We conclude
that newsroom cultures of public broadcasters still cause differences but
others than expected; the second observation is that these differences seem to
be disappearing in favor of a transnational convergence of national news cul-
tures (especially in the case of Britain, Germany, and the United States).
Hypothesis 4: Sound Bite Content
Sound bite news is influenced not only by how journalists edit their stories
but also by how candidates phrase their statements. To capture the subject
matter of candidates’ on-air statements, we used a subset of categories sug-
gested by Bucy and Grabe (2007) that basically distinguishes between sub-
stance, attack, defense, and campaigning.8 In the more confrontational and
commercial setting of U.S. presidential campaigns, the content of candidate
sound bites is expected to be characterized more by “attack rhetoric” and
“campaign rhetoric.” On the European news, by contrast, candidate statements
are expected to be oriented more toward “substance,” especially on the public
service channels. This hypothesis is in line with Plasser’s distinction of cam-
paign styles (2002). He characterizes American campaigns as candidate cen-
tered, money driven, consultancy based, and highly professionalized, with an
excessive orientation toward spin control, issue management, impression
management, and permanent campaigning.Western European campaigns, by
contrast, are described as more party-centered, moderately professionalized,
managed by party staff, and publicly funded (Plasser 2002: 83).As a matter of
fact, we found only mixed support for Hypothesis 4.
Starting with aspects that confirmed the hypothesis, “attack rhetoric” was
indeed the dominant content feature of candidate sound bites in the United
States (Table 4).To both, candidates on the stump and journalists in the edit-
ing suites, “attack” seemed the most appealing angle in their attempts to win
their respective audiences. But—contrary to our expectations—“campaign-
ing” only made it third place, behind a surprisingly strong showing of “sub-
stance” as the second most frequent content feature in U.S. candidate
statements. Put differently, sound bites in the United States may be brief, but
to say that they are therefore automatically without substance would be a mis-
take.9 A second noteworthy difference between national news cultures is the
great number of cases in which British candidates found themselves in
“defense” mode because of an interview style that is much more adversarial on
the BBC and ITV than on other channels, particularly in comparison to France.
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A third noteworthy difference on the national level is the high news value that
“campaign” related candidate statements enjoy on German and French televi-
sion. Despite decade-old claims that U.S. network news is predominated by
horse race and campaign buzz (Patterson and McClure 1976; Farnsworth and
Lichter 2007), our results show that ABC and NBC news producers selected
by far the smallest share of “campaign”-related candidate statements for inte-
gration into their broadcasts.
By all measures, the French candidates appeared as the most civilized on tele-
vision: They were shown uttering the largest amount of substance, the smallest
amount of aggression, and never got in a position in which they had to use
“defense rhetoric” to ward off rough questioning from journalists. In sum, this
analysis revealed meaningful differences between national news cultures that have
remained influential despite convergence processes in other areas of political
communication.We also found further evidence that differences between public
service channels and commercial channels seem to be vanishing.
Hypothesis 5: Sound Bite News as Fight-back
An important reason for adversarial reporting in the press is news manage-
ment and media manipulation by candidates (Semetko et al. 1991; Zaller
1998). Hypothesis 5 thus expected the average length of candidate sound bites
to be shorter in those election campaigns that are tightly scripted and carefully
staged, indicating a stronger resistance among journalists to candidates’
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Table 4
Content of candidate sound bites in average election story (in percentages)
United Great
States Britain Germany France
Cross-2004 2005 2005 2007
national
ABC NBC BBC1# ITV1 ARD# RTL TF1 F2# Average
Substance: Issue 25 30 28 27 21 20 27 36 27
discussions of policies
or news events
Attack rhetoric 43 43 31 26 32 23 32 23 32
Defense rhetoric 7 5 11 23 3 3 1 2 7
Campaigning: Statements 20 17 25 21 42 48 36 36 31
about victory, support,
strategy, momentum
Other 5 5 4 4 2 5 5 3 4
Total duration candidates 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
are seen speaking in (14.1 sec) (10.7 sec) (17.2 sec) (16.1 sec)(11.9 sec) (12.6 sec) (9.2 sec) (12.1 sec)
average election story
Note: N = 859 stories; # indicates public service broadcaster.
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attempts to control the nature of information. Our criterion for determining
the degree to which a campaign is tightly scripted was inspired by John Zaller’s
“measure of news management,” which is based on a careful content analysis of
media references to campaign behaviors that denote either high or low concern
for message control (for a justification of the method, see Zaller 1999). Our
empirical indicator for message control was a category called news situation.We
coded, for each candidate statement, whether it was made in a “fully controlled
news situation,” in a “partially controlled news situation,” or in an “uncontrolled
news situation” (a distinction developed by Bennett 2005). Fully controlled sit-
uations are pseudo-events (e.g., campaign events with screened audiences) that
are planned primarily for generating positive media reports and in which the
candidate controls the setting and scripting to make it difficult for reporters to
findTV images or story angles other than those suggested by the campaign han-
dlers. Partially controlled situations refer to interviews, Q &A sessions at press
conferences, and other communication settings in which the degree of control
over when and how the story is being told is shared between politicians and jour-
nalists. Uncontrolled or out-of-control news situations are usually the result of
wrongdoings, bust-ups with critics, public embarrassments, or smear campaigns
that put the candidate under heavy media pressure.
In line with our expectation, the U.S. campaigns appear as the most highly
orchestrated and tightly scripted: 80 percent of all news situations in which
U.S. candidates speak on television are fully controlled and prevent journalists
from even getting physically near them, let alone interrogating them.
Conversely, the relatively open and accessible British campaign with daily press
conferences, frequent interviews, and spontaneous press avails shows candi-
dates in 80 percent of the cases in partially controlled, interaction-based settings
(seeTable 5 for data and operational definitions).
Our cross-national data show a clear pattern that validates Zaller’s (1998,
1999) theory of media politics. Zaller’s main hypothesis is that the more
strenuously politicians try to control news coverage, the more journalists will
resist covering them and rather report something different that gives expres-
sion to the journalistic voice. Regressional analysis in Figure 2 shows that this
is precisely the case:The more tightly scripted the candidates wage their cam-
paigns (x-axis, intensity of news management), the more the stations com-
press the candidates’ on-air statements (y-axis, average length of sound bites).
This helps us formulate another transnational rule:As political public relations
becomes more professionalized, journalists become increasingly concerned
about preserving their autonomy; dissecting candidates’ statements can be
seen as a countermeasure by journalists to re-establish control over their own
product (Blumler and Gurevitch 1995: 210; Zaller 1998: 127).The relation-
ship between assertive news management style and assertive journalistic
response is mainly determined by country dynamics, not newsroom cultures
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(see Figure 2).This is further proof of the enduring and distinct diversity of
national contexts and their power to explain the behavior of candidates and
journalists.
Hypothesis 6: Prevalence of Image Bites
Television research that focuses on the verbal side and disregards the visual
side is severely constrained because the visual content of candidate portrayals
is a powerful source of political perceptions (Bucy and Grabe 2007; Grabe
2007; Kepplinger 1999). It is increasingly problematic to ignore image bites—
that is, voiceless visuals of candidates—as their use is likely to increase because
they allow for more personalized, dynamic, and attention-grabbing reports.
Hypothesis 6a thus expects the use of candidates’ image bites to be extensive,
accounting at least for the same amount per story as candidate sound bites.The
findings inTable 3 confirm this assumption when cell entries are compared for
“candidates seen speaking as percentage of average story length” to “candidates
seen but not heard as percentage of average story length.”The cross-national
averages show an even split between candidates’ “verbal presence” and “visual
presence” in both the 2000–2002 stories (with the ratio being 13 percent to
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Table 5
Scripted versus unscripted campaign appearances by national candidates, as observed from
media reports (in percentages)
United Great
States Britain Germany France
2004 2005 2005 2007
ABC NBC BBC1# ITV1 ARD# RTL TF1 F2#
Tightly scripted 81 79 30 17 46 48 20 34 44
campaign
appearancesa
Partially scripted, 18 21 70 83 54 52 80 66 56
more interactive
campaign
appearancesb
Total duration 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
candidates are (14.1 sec) (10.7 sec) (17.2 sec) (16.1 sec) (11.9 sec) (12.6 sec) (9.2 sec) (12.1 sec)
seen speaking
in average
election story
Note: N = 859 stories; ‘uncontrolled’ news situations were extremely rare; # indicates public service
broadcaster.
a. Measured as percentage share of news situations onTV in which candidates speak in “fully” controlled cam-
paign settings—disallowing direct exchanges with journalists (e.g., staged stump speeches).
b. Measured as percentage share of news situations onTV in which candidates appear in “partially” or “uncon-
trolled” campaign settings—allowing for direct exchanges with journalists (e.g., interviews).
Cross-
national
Average
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14 percent) and the 2004–2007 stories (ratio 11 percent to 12 percent; see far
right column ofTable 3). As a further transnational rule, we can thus state that
candidates onAmerican, British, French, and GermanTV news are featured as
often in image bites as they are in sound bites. This suggests that viewers
receive double the amount of candidate information on TV news than is
acknowledged in research that focuses on verbal information only.This is not
only true for U.S. news—as shown before by Bucy and Grabe (2007)—but also
across European media systems.
Our results do not demonstrate that use of image bites has grown over time
(as was stipulated by Hypothesis 6b), but they do show that commercial chan-
nels make somewhat more use of them than public channels. The BBC and
ARD devoted 7 to 10 percent of average story time to candidate image bites,
while NBC and RTL assigned 17 to 19 percent (Table 3).We can conclude that
the heavy reliance on visual-driven reporting constitutes a transnational trend
in western election news coverage, but it is more pronounced on commercial
than public stations.
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Figure 2
Relationship between Assertive News Management Style and Assertive Journalistic Response
Note: Logarithmic regression model explains 55 percent of the variance. Graph combines data
fromTable 5 on reports of tightly scripted campaign appearances (x-axis) andTable 2 on average
length of candidate sound bite by channel (y-axis) for the elections 2004–2007.
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Hypothesis 7: Content and Packaging of Image Bites
The fact that candidates appear longer on television news than previous
sound bite research had established does not necessarily mean that they appear
more favorable to voters. Every day,TV stations are able to choose from a variety
of images for their election campaign footage, and the interesting question in
this respect is which images the journalist eventually decides to select. The
majority of images available are positive, as the candidates and their advisors
are naturally interested in providing the audience with an attractive public
appearance. Those journalists who deliberately look for unfavorable depic-
tions, however, will always find some. In fact, our last hypothesis expected
image bites in U.S. news programs to be selected and packaged in ways that
are more disadvantageous to candidates compared to news programs in other
countries. The background of this assumption is Patterson’s (1993) assertion
that U.S. reporters have developed a decidedly low opinion of politicians and
that “bad news” has become the dominant tone of U.S. election coverage.We
tested a possible “anticandidate” treatment of image bites across three packaging
strategies (Table 6).
We first captured the content of image bites by distinguishing five types of
facial displays that are loosely based on categories developed by Kepplinger
(1987, 1999) and Bucy and Bradley (2004).We coded whether the candidate
appeared agitated (operationalized as energetic, aggressive, activated, power-
ful), broadly positive (operationalized as smiling, laughing, optimistic, upbeat,
hopeful, self-confident, certain of victory), neutral (operationalized as expres-
sionless, self-controlled, calm), moderately negative (operationalized as
uneasy, unsure, uncomfortable, anxious, tense, helpless, surprised), or even
clearly negative (operationalized as a noticeably unfavorable or inappropriate
depiction of demeanor).To measure “picture selection bias,” we calculated the
number of stories containing moderately negative and clearly negative image
bites in all four countries’ television news (see first row ofTable 6). Contrary
to our expectation, we found no evidence for a systematic bad-news tendency
on U.S. news. Only the German RTL channel showed a modest preference for
disadvantageous image bites, the bulk of which concernedAngela Merkel, who
is known for her low telegenic appeal. She eventually won the 2005 election
but by a much smaller margin than predicted in the polls.Although RTL’s chief
political correspondent is an admitted Merkel critic (Hofmann 2007), other
studies found no support of a systematic anti-Merkel bias on RTL (Semetko
and Boomgaarden 2007; Schulz and Zeh 2007).
The second anticandidate technique is “lip-flaps,” a category taken from
Grabe’s (2007) innovative study. Grabe describes lip-flaps as a disrespectful
editing technique in which a candidate is shown on screen in full frontal view
(as a close-up or medium range shot) and moving his mouth because he is in for-
mal speaking mode, usually addressing an audience or talking to the reporter. By
420 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
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TV production standards, the nature of such visuals would “require” the reporter
to also allow for the candidate’s voice to be heard, but sometimes, reporters
decide to remove the audio in postproduction and instead use their own voice-
over.This behavior, although regarded as a rude or even patronizing journalis-
tic interference, is an editing technique that has gained currency across many
western democracies.As can be seen from the second row ofTable 6, lip-flaps
are most common among U.S. journalists, followed by their British and German
colleagues; they are rare in France.
The third technique is concerned with who gets the beneficial last say, and
last image, in an election story (Hallin 1992). Effects research suggests that the
“wrap-up” at the end of a story is the most prominent position for the most
powerful message because it is assumed to make the most lasting impression
on the viewer. American journalists are by far the most likely to use this tool
of journalistic domination, followed by the British and the Germans. Displaying
the same country rank order as before, U.S. election coverage emerges as the
most journalist-centered and the French coverage as the least.The fact that the
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Table 6
Packaging of image bites (in percentages)
United Great
States Britain Germany France
Cross-2004 2005 2005 2007
national
ABC NBC BBC1# ITV1 ARD# RTL TF1 F2# Average
Anticandidate Editing I: 4 2 3 5 5 17 0 1 5
Stories containing at
least one “moderately”
or “clearly” negative
image bite of a
candidate (“picture
selection bias”)
Anticandidate Editing II: 14 19 16 12 7 14 8 7 12
Stories in which reporter
talks at least once over a
candidate although
candidate is in formal
speaking mode (“lip-flap”)
Anticandidate Editing III:
Stories whose concluding
sound and image bite
(“wrap-up”) is granted to
Candidatea 13 13 21 23 19 44 33 24 24
Journalist 66 64 44 41 42 21 21 22 40
Total of election stories (n) 120 94 141 171 59 36 103 135
Note: N = 1,308 stories; # indicates public service broadcaster.
a.Wrap-ups by other news sources have been omitted for simplicity of presentation.
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reporters ofTF1 and France 2 used the smallest number of negative candidate
images, lip-flaps, and journalist wrap-ups gives further credence to the idea of
a more deferential reporting style, especially when compared to the some-
times more aggressive tone adopted in the other countries. In sum, the results
provide only partial support for Hypothesis 6. But they do clearly confirm the
by now familiar pattern that differences in news cultures are more fundamen-
tal on the national than on the organizational level.
Conclusions
The findings on sound bite and image bite news let us conclude that media-
centered reporting styles are much more widespread across western media
systems than often assumed. It surely is not a U.S.-specific phenomenon that
is to be explained by U.S.-specific factors and experiences (e.g., Vietnam,
Watergate, etc.).
Several of our results indicate the existence of a transnational news logic that
likely is the result of a diffusion of journalistic standards and values. Evidence of
transnational news culture emerged in the form of several uniform news prac-
tices. In all four countries,we established that (1) reporters’ narration outweighs
that of candidates by three to one in an average election story; (2) reporters dis-
sect and compress candidates’ statements more in tightly controlled than in less
controlled campaigns; (3) reporters feature candidates equally often in voiceless
image bites than in sound bites; (4) this preference for image bites is slightly
more pronounced on commercial than public channels; (5) the difference in
length of candidate sound bites has narrowed between U.S. and European news;
and (6) reporters use anticandidate editing techniques—visual bias, lip flaps—
only occasionally in a relatively small share of their stories.
With regard to the explanatory power of different newsroom cultures, this
study comes to a sobering conclusion. By and large, reporting styles have
grown remarkably similar; different ownership structures and program
philosophies do hardly lead to distinctly dissimilar styles of sound bite news
anymore. With few exceptions (amount of total election coverage, use of
image bites), market-oriented and public interest–oriented newsrooms
showed no substantial differences in election news discourse. A special and
noteworthy case is German RTL, which displayed a swaggering disinterest in
covering the elections; it also carried the most horse race–related sound bites
and the most negative candidate image bites. RTL emerged here as prototypi-
cal representative of a market-oriented news organization that champions the
ideas of consumerism, infotainment, and game fixation.
The most important, and perhaps surprising, finding of this study is the endur-
ing importance of national news cultures in explaining sound bite news.This is
best illustrated by the correspondence analysis in Figure 3. Correspondence
422 Press/Politics 13(4) October 2008
 at Zentralbibliothek Zuerich on September 23, 2008 http://hij.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
analysis is an inductive method used to reveal the structure of a complex data
matrix and to represent it on a visual map—that is, as points within a space,
thereby facilitating the interpretation of results (Clausen 1998).10 Our corre-
spondence analysis is based on a contingency table cross-classifying the eight
channels by their use of ten sound bite variables. Categories with similar distri-
butions (i.e., channels with similar news practices) are represented as points
that are close in space, and categories that have very dissimilar distributions are
positioned furthest apart.The two-dimensional solution presented in Figure 3
explains 89 percent of the variance.The first dimension distinguishes between
a “conflictive” and “cooperative” campaign communication style and the second
between stronger “journalistic voice” and “political voice” in election stories. In
the joint space between these dimensions, three nation-specific news cultures
shine through. They are in close proximity and partly overlap, as suggested
already by the various transnational parallels, but display characteristic contours
nonetheless.
The U.S. news culture is a good illustration of Zaller’s (1998) theory of
media politics, which predicts that high levels of news management at time
point 1 lead to high levels of media negativity at time point 2. In the same vein,
our findings indicate that the more U.S. candidates try to narrow journalists’
news choices, the more network reporters try to regain control over their own
product by compressing candidates’ sound bites, focusing on their attack
rhetoric, and using wrap-ups (and lip-flaps) more freely than their colleagues
from other news backgrounds. Simply because U.S. journalists lack Q & A
opportunities and are often compelled to report the messages and visuals
served up to them, their approach to news making seems affected the most by
an impulse to preserve their independence and to emphasize their skeptical,
power-distant, and interventionist position.
The French news culture displays features of a less professionalized, less inde-
pendently minded journalistic community. In many stories, the candidates, not
the journalists, set the tone that indicates a more passive, sacerdotal, yielding
reporting style. French election news, in general, is more structured by a polit-
ical logic (and the candidates’ policy messages) than by an interventionist media
logic (that would, at times, be less willing to recycle those messages). It is a jour-
nalism that fits the state-centered type of French democracy but may be
regarded as inadequate by adherents of a different type of democracy.
The Anglo-German broadcast culture has sacerdotal elements, too, but they
are balanced by a journalist-centered, interpretative approach.ARD, BBC1, and
ITV1 all favor longer forms of news that offer candidates a platform for their
ideas. But these ideas are confronted with the journalists’ own perspective—
either in the form of daily commentaries on ARDTagesthemen or in-studio policy
analyses and performance evaluations on BBC1 and ITV1. By far, the toughest
candidate interviews aired on the British channels; especially, the aggressive
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questioning on ITV1 elicited a large share of defense rhetoric (Table 4). The
extensive speaking time granted to candidates correlates with a more interac-
tive campaign style of European candidates that imposes fewer restrictions on
media access. But because the interpretative voice of the journalist is always
clearly heard, we label the Anglo-German broadcast culture as moderately
interventionist. An interesting qualification is that the German commercial
channel RTL, owned by the transnational Bertelsmann conglomerate, falls out
of this category because its news profile bears greater resemblance to the
American approach. This is an important reminder of the permeability of
national boundaries and the relativity of national news cultures’ preeminence;
certain border-transgressing influences filter easily through nation-specific
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Figure 3
MappingTV News Cultures (Correspondence Analysis)
Note: The x-axis explains 72 percent and the y-axis explains 17 percent of the variance.
Candidate sound bites long and journalist sound bites long refer to uninterrupted statements longer
than twenty-one seconds; candidate sound bites brief and journalist sound bites brief refer to those
shorter than eleven seconds. Candidate sound bites with attack and candidate sound bites with sub-
stance are explained inTable 4. Tight news management or medium news management refers to the
different campaign styles in Table 5. Wrap-ups by candidate and wrap-ups by journalist are
explained inTable 6. Other variables had to be excluded from analysis because of insufficient
variation or insufficient n-size; all calculations are based on 2004–2007 data.
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institutional barriers and affect journalistic practices in divergent organiza-
tions. Our “nation matters” conclusion can thus only be a tentative one.
The cultures identified here bear similarity to Patterson’s (2008) mapping of
western journalists’ role positions and Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) typology of
western news systems. Patterson’s study is based on survey responses,Hallin and
Mancini’s on institutional features, and our own—muchmore modest undertak-
ing—on actual news content.All three data sources have to be seen together, and
ideally combined in one project, to investigate the fundamental assumption
behind comparative political communication research. This assumption states
that specific constellations of media and political structure (as manifested on the
organizational, national, and transnational level) characteristically shape the
facets of culture (as manifested in news journalists’ ideas, practices, and prod-
ucts, among other things).11With regard to sound bite news, our study was able
to give a fairly specific assessment of the explanatory power of factors located on
the different levels.While national contexts still matter the most, our evidence
for the emergence of a transnational news culture is equally intriguing.The find-
ings suggest that national news cultures (at least as manifested in sound and
image bites) have aligned despite the fact that the political and media structures
in the countries analyzed remain very different. This calls into question the
assumption of a close correspondence between structure and culture. News cul-
tures may be a more autonomous unit of analysis than previously thought; future
research ought to address this question more systematically.
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Notes
1. For this content-based understanding of culture, see also McQuail (2005: 113, 307, 553).
2. Britain is characterized by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as a mixed case, with its print
media falling into the liberal category and its broadcast media into the democratic-
corporatist category.
3. I am indebted to colleagues at the University of Oklahoma, University of Missouri, London
School of Economics and Political Science, University of Loughborough, Free University of
Berlin, University of Mainz, and University of Zurich for infrastructure and assistance.
4. Whereas in the United States, for example, the general election phase lasts eight weeks,
it lasts only four weeks in Great Britain.Whereas the French primary election is just two
weeks before polling day (cutting the field of contenders from a dozen down to two), the
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American primaries start nine to ten months before polling day.Whereas the British can-
didates put their campaigns on rest at weekends, the campaigns in the other countries
continue without pause.
5. Both studies examined U.S. television news, but while we examined all election stories
from two channels over four campaign weeks, Bucy and Grabe analyzed a random sam-
ple from three U.S. networks over eight campaign weeks. In addition, we used broader
operational definitions for election story (by also coding campaign-related news items in
which the main candidates did not appear personally) and for sound bites and image bites
(by also coding their appearances in interviews).
6. When we exclude interview stories from our analysis, we come to almost the same
sound bite means as reported in Farnsworth and Lichter (2007: 83).
7. After criticism for their lackluster campaign coverage in 2001, the sound bite length
increased in 2005 for the first time since 1992—mainly as a result of ITV’s inclusion of
three lengthy interviews with the main party leaders in their bulletins.
8. Originally, Bucy and Grabe (2007) coded for the following content categories: speaking
time devoted to policy positions, reactions to the news, attacks on opponents, defending
one’s role in a controversy, predicting victory, and rallying the troops. Drawing on their
experience, we collapsed the first two into a general substance category called “issue dis-
cussions of policies and news events” and collapsed the last two into a general campaign-
ing category called “statements about victory, support, strategy, momentum.” As can be
seen fromTable 4, we kept “attack rhetoric” and “defense rhetoric” as well as an additional
“other” category for cases that did not fit.
9. These results confirm a conclusion drawn before by Bucy and Grabe (2007).
10. The steps of correspondence analysis are as follows: category profiles (relative frequen-
cies) and masses (marginal proportions) are computed, the distances between these
points are calculated, and the best-fitting spaces of n dimensions are located. Rotation
then occurs to maximize the inertia (variance) explained by each factor, as in principal
components analysis.
11. In the words of Blumler and Gurevitch (1995: 74), the assumption states that “different
features of the structures, norms, and values of political [and media] systems will differ-
entially promote or constrain political communication roles and behaviors within those
systems.” See also Pfetsch (2004).
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